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The Third Law of UK Nuclear Policy: for 
Every Protestation There is an Equal and 
Opposite Affirmation
Lauren Vidler and Hannah Pugh
Brigham Young University
Abstract
Despite consecutive UK governments’ continual support for and renewal of the nucle-
ar program, the UK’s nuclear arsenal has remained a contentious issue on the basis of both 
ethical framework and the cyclical costs of acquiring new nuclear weapons during a climate 
of austerity. Given the political turmoil currently faced post-Brexit, and amidst a potential 
upset in the global axis of power, with its inherent implications for national security, the 
question of the UK’s nuclear program is of critical importance. This policy paper provides 
an expository overview of the major points of contention in the UK nuclear policy debate 
namely; financial, moral, and legal, with consideration given to the internal climate of the 
UK. Additionally it will examine the potential impact that the UK leaving the EU will have 
on the nuclear policy of both the EU and the UK within the methodological framework of 
Sagan’s Three Model’s for Nuclear Weapons Proliferation.
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Introduction
In 1952 the UK tested its first nuclear device, securing itself as the third member of 
the ‘nuclear club’ and guaranteeing its position of power on the international stage for de-
cades to come. Despite consecutive UK governments’ continuous support for and renewal 
of the nuclear program, the UK’s nuclear arsenal has remained a contentious issue on the ba-
sis of both ethical framework and the cyclical costs of acquiring new nuclear weapons amid 
the UK’s long-term economic stagnation. Given the political turmoil currently facing the 
EU and the UK, particularly in regards to a potential upset in the global axis of power and 
its implications for national security, the question of the UK’s nuclear program is of criti-
cal importance. This policy paper provides an expository overview of the major points of 
contention in the UK nuclear policy debate, with special attention given to objections and 
subsequent affirmations. Furthermore, it examines the potential impact that the UK leaving 
the EU will have on the nuclear policy of both the EU and the UK. This examination in-
cludes the issues of: shifting power dynamics within the European Union as France becomes 
the only nuclear weapons state (NWS), the increased significance of the UK maintaining 
geopolitical power as an NWS post Brexit. Using the theoretical framework of Sagan’s 
Three Model’s of Nuclear Proliferation, policy previsions will be explored. 
Timeline of British Weapons System
The UK cemented its position as a NWS in 1952, becoming the third country to 
successfully test an atomic bomb, behind only the United States and the Soviet Union. The 
25-kiloton plutonium implosion bomb detonated off the western coast of Australia under 
the codename “Hurricane” was designed to test the effects of such a weapon, and limit fu-
ture dependence upon the weapons systems of the United States, whilst equally placing the 
UK as a pivotal world power (CTBTO, 1952). 
 Following the success of Operation Hurricane, the UK government reached the 
Nassau Agreement with the United States, which allowed it to procure a SLBM submarine 
based missile system termed Polaris (Cabinet Office, 2008). The British Polaris Programme 
was announced in 1962 and construction began in 1964. The success of Operation Hurri-
cane lead to the development of the UK’s first deployable nuclear weapons: four submarine 
based missile systems, which made up the WMD arsenal until a replacement programme 
was announced under the Thatcher government in the 1980s. 
 The replacement of the UK nuclear programme Polaris provoked considerable 
political debate, primarily due to the high costs associated with the renewal during a period 
of government spending cuts in other sectors. Nevertheless, nuclear renewal went ahead 
underneath the conditions of the Cold War. The Trident  nuclear generation subsequently 
came into use in the 1990s, composed of warheads, submarines and missiles, coinciding with 
the end of the Cold War. The lifespan of the current Trident generation is coming to an end 
and is due to be retired in the 2020s. This has launched the current and ongoing discussions 
about the future of the UK nuclear deterrent. 
Protestations and Affirmations
Arguably more than any other NWS, the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent 
programme has been, and remains, a contentious issue both publicly and politically. Nu-
merous protestations against the possession of a nuclear arsenal exist. Yet interesting, the 
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affirmations mirror the protestations but presented with a different theoretical framework. 
Financial, moral, and legal objections, and contrary affirmations compose the principal ra-
tionale.  This section will examine these areas of contention specifically in regard to the 
decision taken by the UK government to replace the Trident Programme1, which would 
renew the UK’s nuclear arsenal and capabilities for the foreseeable future. 
Financial Protestations  
 The costs of updating the Trident programme are considerable, with current outlay 
estimated to be upward of £50bn, which leads to the first protestation: the costs of renewal 
for British taxpayers. As of March 2017, the UK national debt was estimated to stand at 1.73 
trillion pounds, with the budget deficit for the fiscal year ending March 2017 standing at 
19.1 billion pounds (Office of National Statistics, 2017). Whilst these numbers represent a 
reduction in national debt and budget deficit debt, these diminutions have acquiesced at the 
same time as the introduction of austerity policy across the UK. As such, government ma-
jority support for the renewal of the Trident programme has been met with notable opposi-
tion from sections of the public—particularly those affected by austerity, those with moral 
objections, and many Scottish citizens whose devolved government is against the renewal 
of nuclear weapons and object to Scotland being the base for the UK nuclear arsenal. 
Despite this public dissent, the House of Commons vote for Trident D5 II2 renew-
al was backed by parliament with 472 votes to 117, with cross-party and cross-bench sup-
port of the programme from everyone except the Greens and the SNP (BBC “MPs Vote,” 
2016). A Survation poll conducted for the SNP in January 2015 showed 47.2% of Scottish 
citizens opposing a new generation of nuclear weapons, which would continue to be based 
on the river Clyde in Scotland, with only 31.6% in favour (Survation, 2015). Correspond-
ingly, further polls suggest that support for replacement of Trident is lower in Scotland than 
it is south of the border. However, a 2014 survey conducted by left-wing newspaper The 
Guardian on WMD awareness found 79% of respondents to be against renewal of the Tri-
dent nuclear missile system (Guardian, 2014), suggesting opposition or at the least disinterest 
in renewal amongst sections of the population.  
Another financial remonstration is made by Keith Harley. Harley discusses the 
costs and benefits of nuclear weapons defence exports, arguing not for a comprehensive 
cost-benefits analysis of UK defence exports but rather evincing the industrial offsets, value 
added industrial capabilities for the UK market, and export potential as considerations for 
government replacement of Trident (Hartley, 2006). Using demanding data sets, Harley 
presents these sides of the financial argument and concludes that the “economic costs are 
opportunity costs in the form of forgone alternative” through a conceptual basis and infor-
mation framework, and highlights the inherent economic trade off of WMD renewal.  As 
such, it is not inconsistent that a counter argument to the high public costs of Trident, is 
the expostulation of opportunity costs for the industries and shareholders who benefit from 
the defence industry. 
It is within this framework that the protestation of high taxpayer cost can be re-
1  This paper is not intended to provide a detailed, or comprehensive guide of the UK’s weapons arsenal. For the 
purposes of this paper it is sufficient to know the generations of weapons systems as Polaris, and Trident. 
2   Trident D5 II refers specifically to the Submarine-launched ballistic missiles, within the Trident generation. 
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structured as an affirmation in favour of nuclear renewal. As with any large scale, publicly 
funded project there are fiscal benefits to the national economy through renewal. The 
defence industry is a major employer within the UK, and it is estimated that upwards of 
15,000 people would face termination of employment were Trident replacement not to go 
ahead (BBC “Guide,” 2016).  These are substantial numbers; yet only demonstrate those 
affected at the outset, in no way considering the more far- reaching economic implications. 
It is therefore not unreasonable to consider how this economic trade off may be regarded 
as a political asset which outweighs any potential electoral deficit born of the use of public 
funds for renewal during a time of austerity measures.  
Disarmament/Minimal Deterrence
Since 1956, the UK government has maintained the posture of nuclear deterrent, 
not nuclear arsenal. The 2006 Defence White Paper, conducted by a UK government 
Commission, declares that “the UK nuclear program has only been used to deter acts of 
aggression against [the UK’s] vital interest, never to coerce other states.” Furthermore, the 
White Paper affirms the uncertainty of international politics, and the strategic environment 
in which the UK operates.  Moreover, it claims a possible emergence of threat from new or 
old adversaries of the United Kingdom, as well as asserting that an act of nuclear terrorism 
cannot be ruled out. These assertions and reasons are used as the foundational affirmations 
for renewing the Trident arsenal by the UK government.
The findings of this white paper, are however contested by scholars, most promi-
nently, Nick Ritchie. Ritchie (2009) states, “…it is barely conceivable that British nuclear 
deterrent threats and the consideration of using nuclear weapons against Russia or China 
will ever be part of the solution to future confrontations.” Moreover, Ritchie (2013) argues 
that in the unlikely event of nuclear terrorism, any nuclear response by the UK would be 
viewed as disproportionate, and inimical to western political objectives. Furthermore, the 
concept of ‘vital interests’ could be challenged, along with the premise that the protection 
of these unspecified vial interests, can become coercions in themselves. The UK’s strategic 
security position has transmuted since the establishment of the nuclear programme during 
the Cold War era, with changing global threats which call into question the necessity, and 
even utility, of a WMD arsenal.
In a secondary article, Ritchie (2013) presents the view of UK nuclear strategy assev-
erating, ‘British nuclear policy has long been characterised as one of ‘minimum deterrence,” 
that is, no more weapons than is necessary to deter an adversary. This concept in itself is 
ambiguous at best, as none of the conditions are quantifiable and can be reshaped. Ritchie 
even seems to unintentionally disprove his own argument concluding the [nuclear deter-
rent] “capacity exceeds UK requirements” (Ritchtie, 2011). The 2010 Strategic Defence 
Review noted, “it is right that the United Kingdom should retain a credible, continuous 
and effective minimum nuclear deterrent for as long as the global security situation makes 
that necessary”. This leads into one of the major areas of contention: the changing global 
security landscape vs global zero arguments, questioning the necessity and moral impasse of 
the UK retaining and renewal a nuclear arsenal whilst promoting global non-proliferation.
Non-Proliferation Obligations
 Article VI of the NPT, which the UK ratified in 1968, states the objective of fur-
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thering the goal of nuclear disarmament. “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to 
pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear 
arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” HM Government 
would argue it is indeed complying with the international treaty obligations toward disar-
mament. In the July 1998 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) the government announced 
a decrease in the delivery mechanisms of nuclear weapons, as well as the number of war-
heads allowed on each nuclear submarine. The 2010 SDR went a step further, reducing 
the maximum number of deployable warheads to forty per submarine, with the goal of 
reducing the stockpile by the mid-2020’s. And yet, when examining the figures more 
closely it becomes apparent that despite a reduction in warheads, the tonnage of warheads 
is increasing, meaning the actual destructive nuclear capacity of the UK is either increas-
ing or remaining the same. “In evaluating the destructive power of a nuclear weapon, it is 
customary to use the concept of equivalent megatons (EMT). Equivalent megatonnage is 
defined as the actual megatonnage raised to the two-thirds power (EMT2/3). A single 40kt 
(0.04mt) Polaris warhead represents 0.12 EMT. A single 100kt (0.1mt) Trident warhead 
represents 0.22 EMT. 32 Polaris warheads therefore represent 3.74 EMT, whilst 40 Trident 
warheads represent 8.61 EMT – a 230% increase in EMT” (Ritchtie, 2011). It could be 
argued that this intricate formula exposes the pretence of UK nuclear reduction and scale-
back obligations, and further that it’s complicated nature makes it problematic for public 
discourse. A 2010 cross-party Trident Commission Report stated, “As a nuclear weapon 
state, the UK has a grave responsibility to maintain its arsenal safely and securely, and to be 
at the forefront of the multilateral disarmament process. Some fear that if the UK were to 
decide on a full like-for-like Trident renewal, the UK the same or better capabilities…we 
would risk transmitting the message that we are not serious about moving…towards the 
elimination of nuclear weapons”. 
Moral Protestations  
Any discussion of weapons of mass destruction must consider the moral aspect of 
the argument. This paper does not intent to address the various moral objections about the 
presence of nuclear weapons, nor their use, but rather primarily to consider the general 
public posture toward nuclear objection. The moral aspect, whilst relevant, tends again to 
play out more in public opinion than in policy position. Andrea Berger, an employee of 
The Royal United Services Institute states, “…even in the most extreme circumstances…
the humanitarian consequences of [deploying nuclear weapons] would be so grotesque as to 
be unfathomable” (BBC “Guide,” 2016). Her opinion is not alone, yet many other schol-
ars are sceptical of the potential ‘moral’ impact of getting rid of nuclear weapons. Whilst it 
can be argued that the reduction to total elimination, could send a positive message to non 
Nuclear Weapon states, or those currently in development, it could also be argued that the 
UK has a moral obligation to other states who depend upon the protection provided by 
the UK nuclear program - e.g. the European Union. This argument would premise on the 
moral rationale that a states primary responsibility is the survival of the nation. Following 
from which, it could be argued that secondary to that principle obligation is the defence or 
protection of allied nations against nuclear attack or intimidation. 
The United Kingdom is arguably one of the strongest EU defence postures as one 
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of only two member states possessing full-spectrum military capabilities (Institute for Gov-
ernment, 2017). The consequences of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union are 
yet to be seen, however, there will be a considerable impact on EU Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP). The European Union met in September 2016 noting, “the result 
could impact the future of the British Trident system and the loss of decision making power 
with the CFSP, which implements disarmament and non-proliferation agreements” (NTI, 
2017). The conventional weapons capabilities of the EU are currently supplemented by 
both the UK and French NW programmes, and are provided with significant financial sup-
port. HM Government has indicated a desire to maintain close defence relations with the 
EU post-Brexit. However arguably more than ever, the influence and role of the UK as a 
pivotal world power will be assured through its possession of NW’s. Furthermore, the direct 
loss of these nationally owned weapons would have security implications for the European 
Union post Brexit. However, given the prospective nature of these events, and suppositions 
implicitly attached, any prognosticated policy should be based in application of established 
methodology.   
Nuclear Weapons after Brexit
Given that this is a predictive argument concerning future policy, Sagan’s three 
models of proliferation will be employed to examine how the UK’s decision to exit the 
European Union could potentially affect UK nuclear policy. According to the Institute for 
Government (2017) the UK’s exit from the EU does not intrinsically change its nuclear 
policy, because “the power to develop and implement security and defence policy lies with 
member states, not the EU.” That is, there are no legal mechanisms requiring a change. 
Furthermore, evaluation under Sagan’s three models suggests that the incentives for the UK 
to retain their nuclear weapons will only increase after the UK leaves the Union. 
Security Model
According to Sagan’s Security model (2012), states make decisions to develop 
nuclear weapons or to exercise nuclear restraint based on their position in a “multipolar 
world” (p. 62). Before examining changing military and security threats to a post-Brexit 
UK, it is significant to consider how the poles around the UK will shift as the UK leaves 
the EU. As an EU member state, the UK has participated in CSDP, an effort set up at the 
1998 St. Malo Summit “designed to allow EU members states to combine their security 
and defence efforts should the need arise” (Institute for Government, 2016). While the past 
decade has been characterized by the efforts of many member states to build a closer, more 
integrated EU defence policy, the UK has resisted further integration; it vetoed an increase 
in the European Defence Agency (EDA) budget for six consecutive years (Maas, 2016) and 
vetoed the establishment of EU military headquarters in Brussels (Waterfield, 2011). With-
out the UK, however, the EU will likely be able to implement a more integrated defence 
policy; as can be observed from an  already increased EDA budget. While the UK resisted 
the fiscal contributions and additional responsibilities necessary to further integration while 
in the Union, if the integration proceeds without the UK, the UK may find its position 
outside an ever-closer Union is more troubling than inside. An even more-integrated EU 
is unlikely to pose a direct military or security threat to the UK, the sentiments of isolation 
that stronger EU defence force will create are likely to encourage the UK to double down 
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on its position as an NWS.
Sagan’s security model postulates that states develop nuclear weapons to “protect 
their sovereignty and national security” by “balance[ing] any rival state that develops nuclear 
weapons by gaining access to a nuclear deterrent” (p. 57). Given the UK’s long history as 
a NWS with a deterrent system as well as the global climate of nuclear proliferation, ad-
ditional distinct threats to sovereignty and national security are unlikely to emerge after a 
UK exit from the EU.  
 Under Sagan’s security model, nuclear restraint is exercised because “external 
security threats [are] radically changed or reevaluated” leading to a perceived “absence of 
the fundamental military threats that produce positive proliferation decisions” (p. 61). To 
apply this model to a post-Brexit UK, we must consider how already existing threats will 
be evaluated differently as a result of Brexit. The 2014 Trident Commission Final Report 
lays out the three threat types the UK faces, all of which arguably make it necessary to 
maintain their nuclear weapons. In 2016, during her first speech as Prime Minster, Theresa 
May discussed all three of these threats as reasons that the UK must retain its nuclear capac-
ity. Comparison of the language between both the Trident Commission Report and May’s 
speech, suggests that there has been no significant re-conceptualisation that would produce 
changes compatible with nuclear restraint. 
Table 1
Threat Trident Commission Final 
Report (2014)





“The first is a re-emergence 
of a nuclear threat from a 
state with a significant nuclear 
arsenal and overwhelming 
conventional capabilities, and 
with an aggressive posture. 
The only current example of 
this possibility is Russia.”
 “There is the threat from existing nu-
clear states such as Russia. We know 
that President Putin is upgrading his 
nuclear forces. In the past two years, 
there has been a disturbing increase in 
both Russian rhetoric about the use 
of nuclear weapons and the frequency 
of snap nuclear exercises. . . . There 
is no doubt about President Putin’s 
willingness to undermine the rules-
based international system in order to 
advance his own interests.”
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New Nucle-
ar State
“The second possibility is an 
existing or emerging nuclear- 
armed state that attains global 
reach and enters into direct 
strategic competition with the 
UK.”
 “There is the threat from countries 
that wish to acquire nuclear capabili-
ties illegally. North Korea has stated 
a clear intent to develop and deploy 
a nuclear weapon, and it continues 
to work towards that goal, in flagrant 
violation of a series of United Na-
tions Security Council resolutions. 
. . . There is, of course, the danger 
that North Korea might share its 
technology or its weapons with other 




“The third is the emergence of 
a future massive overwhelm-
ing threat involving bio-
weapons or other comparable 
mass destruction technologies 
still unknown in which a state 
might consider the explicit 
use or threat of use against the 
UK, but be deterred by the 
UK’s possession of nuclear 
weapons.”
“There is the question of future 
nuclear threats that we cannot even 
anticipate today. . . . Once nuclear 
weapons have been given up, it is 
almost impossible to get them back, 
and the process of creating a new de-
terrent takes many decades. We could 
not redevelop a deterrent fast enough 
to respond to a new and unforeseen 
nuclear threat, so the decision on 
whether to renew our nuclear deter-
rent hinges not just on the threats we 
face today, but on an assessment of 
what the world will be like over the 
coming decades.
It is impossible to say for certain that 
no such extreme threats will emerge 
in the next 30 or 40 years to threaten 
our security and way of life, and it 
would be an act of gross irresponsibil-
ity to lose the ability to meet such 
threats by discarding the ultimate 
insurance against those risks in the 
future.”
Theresa May and Trident Commission on the UK Nuclear Program.
Domestic Politics Model
 According to Sagan’s Domestic Politics Model, decisions concerning restraint or 
proliferation are made not on the basis of what “serves the national interests of a state” 
but instead what serves “the parochial bureaucratic or political interests of at least some 
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individual actors within the state,” particularly “the state’s nuclear energy establishment,” 
“important units within the professional military,” and “politicians” (p. 65). This model 
complicates the previous one because “international threats are seen as being more malleable 
and more subject to interpretation and can therefore produce a variety of responses from 
domestic actors,” which implies that “security threats are not the central cause of weapons 
decisions” but are instead “windows of opportunity” (p. 65).
As the UK Government navigates its departure from the EU, a primary interest of 
the Conservative Government is protecting its majority in Parliament. Given that a Con-
servative Government proposed and executed the Brexit Referendum, and that another 
Conservative Government will preside over the negotiation and execution of Brexit, the 
Conservative Party is in a particularly vulnerable position should the UK suffer as a result of 
leaving the EU. Consequently, particularly in the domestic policy arena, the UK Govern-
ment is incentivized to employ policies that will at minimum appear to mitigate the chal-
lenges presented by Brexit. 
As discussed above, further EU defence integration without the UK will cultivate 
feelings of isolation and fear of inferiority among British nationals. The Government can ef-
fectively respond to these sentiments by both directing military fears elsewhere and appear-
ing to secure the nation against perceived developing threats. This is accomplished through 
treatment of military and security threats that emphasize potential, ambiguous, future threats 
that can be responded to through nuclear weapons retention, rather than emphasizing con-
crete and particular threats such as Iran, Russia, or North Korea which can only be resolved 
through specific policies and actions. Thus it is clear that while expressly opposing “retain-
ing a military nuclear capability as a general insurance against an uncertain future,” (Brit-
ish Americab Security Information Council, 2014) the Government actually promotes the 
retention of nuclear weapons because “if there is more than a negligible chance that the 
possession of nuclear weapons might play a decisive future role in the defence of the United 
Kingdom and its allies, in preventing nuclear blackmail, or in affecting the wider security 
context within which the UK sits, then they should be retained” (p. 5). The particular 
stress on retaining nuclear weapons as a deterrent against  potential future threats puts the 
Conservative Government in the position of appearing to protect the nation, while actually 
creating and subverting a threat in order to gain more political support. 
An additional harm the UK faces as a result of Brexit is economic downturn and 
job loss. In encouraging the renewal of Trident, the Government makes the case that the 
UK’s nuclear program is not just about defence but is also about providing “30,000 jobs 
here in the United Kingdom” as well as “the development of skills here in the United 
Kingdom that will be of benefit to our engineering and design base for many years to come” 
(May, 2016). The domestic politics need for positive job growth incentivizes the Govern-
ment to renew Trident and in so doing to guarantee a certain amount of jobs. 
Sagan further posits that “major internal political changes” are often conduits to 
changes in policy favouring restraint (p. 69). However, this assertion by Sagan has not been 
observed in the case of the UK where the government position on nuclear restraint has 
not changed despite considerable domestic changes. The resignation of David Cameron as 
Prime Minister and the formation of a new Government following the UK’s vote to leave 
the EU would potentially serve such a purpose for Sagan’s model. However, there has not 
been a major shift in the Government’s position since the May Government entered power, 
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as demonstrated by May’s speech mirroring the 2014 Trident report. This is not surprising, 
however, given that before becoming Prime Minister, Theresa May served as Home Sec-
retary for six years, a post that included responsibility for “security and terrorism” (“Min-
isterial Role”) Continuity in nuclear weapons policy between the Cameron Government 
and the May Government is therefore to be expected. The incongruity between Sagan’s 
Model and the UK case study could be dampened by the continuity of political party in the 
wake of the Brexit decision. However, it should be noted that since the UK first adopted 
nuclear weapons capabilities, each government has maintained the nuclear arsenal regardless 
of political persuasion, or domestic tensions. As such, it could be argued that whilst many 
elements of Sagan’s model fit, this element of his framework, which suggest policy change 
in favour of restraint, is arguably inaccurate in this specific case. 
Norms Model
According to Sagan’s Norms model, “military organizations and their weapons 
. . . are part of what modern states believe they have to possess to be legitimate, modern 
states” (p. 74). These “perceptions of legitimacy and prestige” shift over time, but seem to 
consistently influence states’ decisions (p. 76). Thus, according to Sagan’s third model, the 
decision to proliferate or restrain is ultimately a question of defining and increasing legiti-
macy and prestige. As the UK leaves the EU, many would argue the distinct legitimacy and 
prestige associated with both the general membership and the particularly privileged posi-
tion the UK maintains within the EU. Because of this many would argue that the desire 
to reemphasize alternative types of legitimacy and prestige will rise. The retention, and re-
newal, of a nuclear arsenal could do this. Where retention itself would arguably not alter the 
global posture of the UK, a renewal provides at the very least the opportunity for weapons 
upgrade, and re-establishment of global political positioning. 
 With its decision to leave the EU, the UK is altering its international axel, yet 
retains its prestige as one of five nuclear weapons states. The legitimacy and prestige associ-
ated with the UK’s status as an NWS becomes more important after Brexit because it can 
be leveraged in multiple, varied arenas in place of the legitimacy and prestige associated 
with EU membership. The form of legitimacy and prestige resulting from the UK’s nuclear 
capabilities is anchored in the ability to effectively protect the self and others from nuclear 
threats and is thus amplified through retention of nuclear weapons. 
 The first form that this legitimacy and prestige takes is the capabilities to protect 
the UK from nuclear threats through the deterrent system. This prestige is rooted in the 
exclusive nature of membership in the NWS club. Particularly revealing is Theresa May’s 
(2016) language that “we will maintain the most significant security and military capability 
in Europe.” The superlative here emphasizes not just that the UK has robust military capaci-
ties, but that they are the highest capabilities in Europe. This suggests that as the UK leaves 
the EU, one particularly important way for it to maintain prestige is to maintain the nuclear 
weapons system that sets it apart from the rest of Europe. Furthermore, given the economic 
and political vulnerability of the UK during the transitional period, nuclear weapons pro-
vide assurance of the UK’s unmistakable place at the top. The sense of invincibility created 
by the nuclear weapons was communicated by May (2016) when she said that the through 
the “retention of our own independent deterrent” the UK is able to “send an unequivocal 
message to any adversary that the cost of an attack on our United Kingdom or our allies will 
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always be far greater than anything it might hope to gain through such an attack.” In other 
words, the legitimacy accorded the UK through its nuclear weapons takes the form of an 
assurance of particular safety rooted in its elite membership in the NWS club. 
 The second form that this legitimacy and prestige takes is the power to negotiate 
global issues of nuclear proliferation as a member of the NWS club. Over the course of its 
membership in the EU, the UK was able to consistently leverage the power of its economy 
and military forces to direct the EU in the directions it found most suitable. While the UK 
will lose the particular legitimacy and negotiating power it has leveraged within the EU the 
situation could unfold in one of two ways. Either the UK could lose position—and par-
ticularly during Brexit negotiations--, be at the mercy of EU members states who have the 
power to construct policies that affect the UK going forward. Alternatively, the UK may be 
able to utilize its full spectrum standing as a bargaining chip in the negotiations—although 
some states may view this as a hostile posture. In either instance, the UK retains a very 
powerful seat at the nuclear negotiating table. This seat will become more important in a 
post-Brexit world as the Government seeks to affirm that the UK is still able to leverage its 
power to achieve its own ends. Without its nuclear weapon status, the Trident Commis-
sion’s Final Report argues, “it is doubtful that the UK would retain continuing influence on 
the thinking or process of nuclear negotiations if it ceased all its nuclear weapon activities.” 
Therefore, given the increased importance of the legitimacy of that influence, it is clear the 
UK will retain their weapons. 
 The third form that this legitimacy and prestige takes is the UK’s position as de-
fenders of non-nuclear states. May (2016) argues that “being recognised as one of the five 
nuclear weapons states under the nuclear non-proliferation treaty confers [on us] unique 
responsibilities, because many of the nations that signed the treaty in the 1960s did so on the 
understanding that they were protected by NATO’s nuclear umbrella, including the UK 
deterrent.” The UK’s nuclear weapons allow them to maintain a status as protector of other 
states - a status that makes the UK necessary and important to many states. Thus, though the 
UK will face a certain degree of international isolation as a result of its exclusion from the 
EU, its responsibilities to other non-nuclear states ensure a certain degree of international 
cooperation. 
Conclusion
 Thus it has been shown that there are many objections and contending affirma-
tions for the retention of UK nuclear deterrent capabilities. These protestations and op-
posing affirmations take the form of financial, moral, and legal objections within the in-
ternational non-proliferation framework to which the UK is party. Financially, the cost 
of Trident renewal is considerable, and has garnered much public opposition within the 
current conditions of austerity. Morally, the objections are less complex, with the rationale 
that nuclear weapons are grotesque, inhumane, and unnecessary. The moral objections are 
further strengthened by the UK’s position as a proponent of non-proliferation. Conflict-
ingly, affirmations for renewal cite the fiscal benefits to the UK economy and job market. 
Morally it is argued that the UK has a duty to protect its citizens and allies in the global 
climate of threat and uncertainty. The current global trend toward nuclear proliferation, in 
defiance of persistent international pressure in favour of non-proliferation led by the NW5, 
is promoted continually as the principal rationale for UK nuclear posture.  Along with the 
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arguments of an uncertain global strategic environment, and the necessity of nuclear parity 
with peer adversaries in the face of an impending Brexit, the retention of nuclear capabilities 
is arguably more necessary than ever. This expository review of affirmations and protesta-
tions of Trident renewal, as well as the theoretical framework of Sagan, suggest the incen-
tives for the UK to retain their nuclear weapons will only increase after the UK leaves the 
European Union. This is due to the belief that states look to their weapons and military 
assets as a means of legitimacy in international community. Leaving the EU will inevitably 
alter the UK’s global position, which will need to be re-established.  The case study of the 
UK demonstrate that Sagan’s models are an imperfect fit for the complexities of interna-
tional power dynamics post-Brexit, and do not hold true in all regards. Yet, the sustention 
of a nuclear arsenal will arguably always provide the UK with advantaged bargaining power 
internationally. As such it is unjustifiable under Sagan’s model to presume the UK will not 
renew or disarm anytime in the near future. 
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